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ABSTRACT 
Technology and Terrorism: The Effects of Cell Phone Coverage on Terrorism 
Ashali Chimata 
Department of International Studies 
Texas A&M University 
Research Advisor: Dr. Johanna Dunaway 
Department of Communication 
Texas A&M University 
The spread of mobile technology and coverage has had transformative effects, and most current 
literature focuses on the positive effects of this technology; it holds leaders accountable, 
facilitates democracy, and encourages transparency. More recently, there has been research done 
on the relationship between mobile phone availability and violent conflicts. However, there has 
yet to be research done on the link between cell phone coverage and terrorism. Moreover, most 
research does not take other characteristics of weak and failing states that may contribute to 
terrorism into account such as regime type. I will investigate this link using data from the START 
terrorism database and Collins Coverage by Harper Collins Publisher, and I will focus on the 
states in the Middle East and North African region. I contend that cell phone coverage helps 
terror cells overcome collective actions issues and create diaspora networks, and this will lead to 
more terror activity. I also hypothesize that the effects of cell coverage will be more pronounced 
in states where the technology rapidly improved and in those that score highest in the “state 
legitimacy” category on the Fragile States Index. This research can help states identify problem 
areas, understand the technology terror groups use, and help governments maintain a monopoly 
on organized violence.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Thesis Statement 
Cell phone coverage allows terror cells to overcome collective actions issues, create diaspora 
networks, and communicate with their intended audience with ease, and this will lead to more 
terror activity. Increases in terror incidents will be more pronounced in states where mobile 
coverage has increased rapidly, and there will be little change in states where the amount of 
coverage has remained stagnant. Additionally, the highest number of terror attacks will occur in 
states that score above an eight on the Fragile States Index in the “state legitimacy” category, 
because the lack of a strong authoritarian government is an indicator for violent non-state actor 
involvement.  
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Motivation and Background Information  
Threshold Concepts  
To begin, some background concepts must be addressed; the first of which is the definition of 
terrorism, and the second is the main objectives of terror groups. A definitive definition of the 
term is difficult to reach because of the various discourses surrounding what constitutes 
terrorism. Different governmental organizations, countries, and databases define it differently. 
However, the most important aspect of the definition is the motive behind the acts or threat of 
violence; they must be intended to intimidate a civilian population, to influence the policy of a 
government, and to affect the conduct of a government. In other words, the motivation must be a 
political agenda. Second, to illustrate how the news media meets the needs of terror 
organizations, their objectives must first be covered. Professor of Media at Naif Arab University 
for Security Sciences, Taha Najem, outlined four main objectives. The first is the recognition and 
legitimization of their name and ideology. Next is the ability to recruit and communicate with 
their supporters, and then their ability to communicate with those who have the power to enact 
their agenda. Lastly, they want to be depicted as legitimate alternatives to their actual 
governments (Najem, 4). Dr. Brigitte Nacos, from Columbia University, wrote a study titled 
“Terrorism/Counterterrorism and Media in the Age of Global Communication.” In her study, she 
highlighted the most important goals for a terror organization which go further than their need to 
legitimize and communicate. She emphasized the intimidating and awareness goal, and a prime 
example of that is the 1972 Olympic Games attack by the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO). She also articulated their need to be respected and sympathized with (Nacos, 6-7). 
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Tapping into the power of the media is a means to achieving every one of the goals outlined by 
these researchers. Now that we have identified these threshold concepts, we can discuss the news 
media’s organizational structure and culture.  
A Brief History of Communication Technology Use by Terror Groups
 A thesis project at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, by Nourah Shuaibi, studied 
the impact of mass media of terrorism. His thesis outlined three eras of mass communication 
which affected terror organizations. The first of which occurred in the 19th century with the 
printing machine. The second happened at the beginning of the 1970s with the advent of 
television satellites; for the first time, international terrorism was possible as terrorists were able 
to spread their messages to more people. The third and final distinct wave of mass 
communication was during the tail end of the 20th century; this time it was not a technological 
invention, rather, news began being administered in a different way. News became twenty-four 
hour around the clock coverage, sometimes dubbed the “CNN Effect” (Shuaibi, 6-7). Throughout 
history, various forms of media have been used to spread propaganda and influence attitudes and 
opinions; for example, the Nazis used the radio to spread their messages. In its infancy, terrorism 
focused on advancing specific political agendas, without the intention of mass casualties and 
collateral damage. However, that tide turned starting with the 1972 Olympic Games attack by the 
PLO; it was the first instance of a terror group exploiting media attention to garner legitimacy 
and credibility, and it coincided with the aforementioned second wave of mass communication, 
in which satellites were making mass communication possible (O’Donnell & Gray, 129). Those 
Olympic Games marked the first time satellite technology provided live coverage of the games. 
It was during this event that one of the terrorists acknowledged the importance of the media in 
                                                                   !  5
their attack Shuaibi’s thesis project. “We recognize that sport is the modern religion of the 
Western world. We knew that people in England and America would switch their television sets 
from any program about the plight of the Palestinians if there was a sporting event on another 
channel. So we decided to use their Olympics...to make the world pay attention to us...from 
Munich onwards, nobody ignore the Palestinians or their cause.” (Shuaibi, 8)
The utilization of the mass communication outlets by terror organizations is not a new 
development; prior to the advent of the digital revolution, extremist groups such as the PLO and 
Al Qaeda used audio cassettes, pamphlets, and videotapes. The founder of Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin 
Laden, recognized the importance of publicity from the very beginning. During the Cold War, 
Bin Laden was fighting the Soviet Union with Afghani Mujahideens, and he chose a select few 
filmmakers to travel with him. Additionally, in the 1990’s, Bin Laden pursued the establishment 
of a media office in London. Up until this point, the means of mass communication were not 
readily available in the Middle East. However, beginning in the 1990’s, new local language news 
channels were established (Burke). One of the prominent channels was Al Jazeera; it was widely 
criticized for allowing Bin Laden a method of disseminating his unfiltered messages (O’Donnell 
& Gray, 129). Bin Laden took advantage of the newfound technology and regularly sent taped 
video statements and organized press conferences.  By the September 11th attacks, Al Qaeda had 
captured media attention around the world and amplified their message and agenda through the 
media (Burke). More information regarding terrorism since the digital revolution will be covered 
in a later section.  
Communication Technology Facilitating Terrorist Activity  
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Starting in the mid-2000’s, digital media drastically changed the way the media was used. 
Organizations could finally obtain cheap equipment and editing software, digitally send videos to 
news organizations, and fundraise effectively. In fact, with the internet, groups relied less and 
less on news bureaus to disseminate their materials; they could broadcast them over the largely 
unregulated world wide web. The most notable shift that occurred with digital media was that 
people could now send unfiltered messages. In traditional news media, your message gets altered 
by hours of commentary from anchors, edited clips, news framing, and the gatekeepers in the 
organization. However, with social media, terrorists could go around the traditional media to 
communicate directly with their audiences. For example, when Al-Qaeda executed American 
Nicholas Berg, they posted the video on a website. It received thousands of hits and downloads, 
and traditional media had nothing to do with it. Eventually, the arrival of smartphones also 
marked a turning point in how people consumed media. ISIS was one of the first organizations to 
fully exploit the power of social media through live-tweeting or live-streaming, and over time, 
these technologies gave way to a wave of “leaderless jihad.” They are increasingly relying on 
digital media to reach out to and motivate their “lone wolf” recruits, like in the case of the 
Charlie Hebdo attacks or the many western attacks from professed ISIS fighters (Burke). 
Individuals in different parts of the world can now learn bomb-making skills through Youtube 
videos or understand the principles of a larger terror group through a chatroom. In the Fig below 
it is evident that the increases in lone wolf terrorism coincide with the three waves of mass 
communication mentioned in the historical section. Presently, many terror groups have members 
dedicated to just handling the media and managing their public image. For example, Al-
Shabaab’s media wing is named the al-Kataib Media Foundation (Menkhaus, 138). Norah 
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Shuaibi’s earlier mentioned thesis project also postulated The Triangle of Political 
Communication as a model to explain how terror organizations view their reliance on the media 
(Shuaibi). The following figure illustrates the how groups can use the media as a vehicle to reach 
policymakers and possible recruits. Targeting digital media is crucial for the terrorists to advance 
their political agenda as seen in this diagram. 
Figure 1. The Triangle of Political Communication (Shuaibi)
Overall, the digital revolution provided terror groups with a new way to achieve their objectives 
with less work and middlemen; as a result, these less centralized networks are more difficult to 
track and stop. 
A Case Study: Al-Shabaab and The Digital Revolution  
No other extremist group has harnessed the power of social media and technology quite the way 
Somali jihadi group, Al-Shabaab, did during the 2010s. Understanding the ways in which 
technology facilitated their cause, but also worked against them, will help illustrate what 
terrorists have to gain and lose from its use. The internet moved Al-Shabaab from relative 
obscurity to notoriety around 2008. Exploiting the local technology and social media was 
integral in narrative building and developing a “virtual jihad” within the diaspora of Somali 
people, especially considering the relative lack of internet usage by Somali citizens. It also 
helped fund their activities through extorting or taxing telecommunication companies in areas 
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under their control. Social media allowed the group to maintain the already present narrative of 
Somali victimhood and exploitation by the West; they were also to communicate with the 
diaspora and appeal to their sense of displacement and alienation. The group posted Youtube 
videos, live tweeted attacks, used chatrooms, ran an official website, and produced high quality 
videos; all these forms of media allowed them to communicate with the diaspora and those 
sympathetic to their plight. Many of their recruits became self-radicalized through their content. 
In their case, the media helped them achieve their recruitment and respect and sympathy goals. 
They even allowed certain sympathetic journalists to interview or film them; however, this is 
where a double-edged sword occurred. Al-Shabaab has less control of their message with a 
reporter or while using Twitter. Ultimately, this led to their downfall as inter-organizational 
disputes were posted on Twitter, which ended with a violent confrontation in 2013. Furthermore, 
their cell phone usage left them exposed to surveillance and U.S. drone strikes, so much so that, 
they began prohibiting internet usage in their controlled region. They even attacked the 
telecommunications provider that they were profiteering off of, so that they would stop their 
services (Menkhaus). It allowed them to circumvent media outlets and inspire recruits abroad. 
For Al-Shabaab, the digital revolution was central to their development, but also, to their 
undoing.  
It is clear that communication technology is integral to achieving a terror group’s objectives and 
communicating with the largest audience possible to influence key decision makers. The ability 
to use this technology easily will attract terror groups to a state or region. 
                                                                   !  9
Statement of the Problem 
Given the earlier mentioned case studies and use of communication technology, it can be 
hypothesized that the ability to disseminate information quickly about politically-motivated 
violence through private communication networks should improve their effectiveness. Cell 
phone technology must allow non-state actors to overcome collective action issue and engage in 
terrorist networks that are more spread out and lack traditional training functions. This can 
disrupt the government monopoly on organized violence and group coordination. Given the logic 
and examples outlined, I contend that the ability to coordinate, plan, and execute terrorist activity 
by non-state actors is enabled through private communication networks. Furthermore, cell phone 
coverage allows non-state actors to not only plan better, but also achieve their goals of publicity 
easier. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The spread of mobile phone technology is often regarded, and rightly so, as a transformative 
force in developing parts of the world. The positive economic and development outcomes have 
been proven in many research studies. For example, one paper reveals a significant negative 
relationship between cell phone availability and institutional corruption (Bailard 2009). A similar 
study shows a positive correlation between cell phone availability and agricultural and labor 
market efficiency (Aker et al. 2010). Which brings me to my next point, most of this research 
focuses on the effects to groups or institutions rather than individuals. Additionally, while the 
economic effects have been researched, less attention has been given to the political effects. 
Moreover, much research has not been done on the correlation between the proliferation of 
telecommunication infrastructure and violence. More recently, some studies have addressed the 
relationship between cell phone availability and violent conflict. Namely, a paper in the 
American Political Science established a positive relationship in the African continent 
specifically (Pierskella and Hollenback 2013). Likewise, a study in the Journal of Peace 
Research proves a positive correlation between ethnic conflict and mobile usage (Bailard 2015). 
However, there hasn’t been any research on cell phone coverage and a violent global 
phenomenon. In addition, terrorism differs in one very important and distinct way from other 
types of violent conflict; it is actions that are done to push for a political agenda. Media and 
mobile technology are integral to political motivations since it how they reach wide audiences to 
incite mass panic. Also, modern terrorism is increasingly embracing the “lone wolf” model of 
terrorism. Terror cells to not need to rely on direct recruitment and training to achieve their goals. 
Also, nonstate actors struggle with free rider issues and coordination problems that require 
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interpersonal communication technology to organize against the state. This paper will analyze 
mobile phone coverage’s effect on a global phenomenon not limited to one region and control for 
other factors such as riots or coups. Tracking the expansion of cell phone coverage with that of 
terrorist activity will establish cell phone use as a key indicator of future attacks. 
Theoretical Framework 
To investigate this research question, I will use data from the START terrorism database and 
Collins Coverage data along with country level data on political and institutional characteristics 
to explore the significance of relationships between cell phone coverage and terrorist incidents. 
Collins Coverage consists of information submitted by mobile network operators from around 
the world.  Specifically, I will test whether the expansion of cell phone coverage in a given 
geographic locale is positively correlated with the occurrence of terrorist incidents in the same 
area. Existing social scientific work on changing communication technologies establishes their 
potential for facilitating collective action in pursuit of both positive (i.e. the coordination of 
peaceful protest) and negative (i.e. the coordination of violent acts) goals. Building on this work 
my research will investigate the question posed through the theoretical lenses of collective action 
problems (e.g. Lupia and Sin 2003). Other than access to the primary databases referenced 
above, this research will require access to social science research articles available through the 
TAMU library and software for analyzing statistical relationships which are either available 
freely online or through TAMU computing resources or Professor Dunaway. 
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Databases 
Collins Coverage is an online mapping service designed to help Mobile Network Operators 
(MNOs) demonstrate to customers their true global network footprint. Using coverage 
information that has been submitted by operators around the world, this data provides frequently 
updated coverage maps to give insight into mobile network coverage across the world. 
Moreover, the map datasets show aggregated GSM, 3G, and 4G coverage allowing us to view 
how much coverage each region has and when it got that level of coverage. It is important to 
note that this data only indicates the availability of cell phone coverage, not network traffic or 
usage by individual citizens. It is represented using spatial polygons. Given that this data is 
expensive to license and use, Harper Collins Publisher told me to obtain the data through another 
Texas A&M University Department that had already bought it. However, much of the data was 
incomplete for the purposes of this project, so I was only able to analyze GSM and 3G coverage 
from 2011, 2012, and 2013. The attributes that I will focus on are shape area and shape length 
which denote the perimeter and area of the polygon in each country which represents the amount 
of coverage in that country.  
The START Global Terrorism Database is an open-source database that tracks all terror activity 
from 1970 to 2018. It was originally started by Pinkerton Global Intelligence Services, but since 
2012, has been managed by a research team at the University of Maryland. This database tracks 
not only international terror incidents, but also domestic ones. For each event, we can view the 
number of casualties, actors responsible, weapons used, and exact location. This statistical 
information is based on a number of media sources, but information is not published until 
credibility is established. To date, the database includes over 180,000 terror incidents with 45 - 
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120 variables per incident. For the purposes of this project, I limited the database to only 
counting incidents which were not ambiguous and met the three criterion for acts of terrorism. 
These include the attack being aimed at attaining a political, economic, or social goal, evidence 
of the intention to convey a message to or intimidate a larger audience, and the action must be 
outside the bounds of legitimate acts of warfare and violate international norms or laws.  
The Fragile States Index is a database created and managed by the Fund for Peace which is an 
independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) non-profit based in Washington, D.C. and Abuja, Nigeria. 
They aim to prevent conflict and promote global security by creating practical tools to anticipate 
conditions that lead to conflict. Annually, they produce the Fragile States Index which ranks 178 
countries across 12 indicators of risks, conditions, regimes, and vulnerabilities. They work 
directly with local and international partners to collect regional data and trends for this index. 
These indicators include security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievances, economic 
decline, unequal economic development, brain drain, state legitimacy, public services, human 
rights violations, demographic pressures, refugees, and external intervention. I will focus on the 
state legitimacy indicator for this project. The index’s methodology uses both qualitative and 
quantitative indicators.  
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DISCUSSION 
For this project, I used data from sixteen states in the Middle East and North African (MENA) 
region. I chose these states because they have experienced rapid telecommunications 
improvements in recent years and have a high concentration of violent non-state actors. I also 
included Afghanistan and Turkey due to their proximity to the region and the former’s inclusion 
in the regional Arab League organization. The states that I considered are Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Israel, Lebanon, Kuwait, Bahrain, Morocco, 
Sudan, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Turkey. Exclusion of other MENA region states such as Oman or 
Tunisia are due to incomplete data. Due to data limitations, I was unable to conduct statistical 
analysis and regression models to establish a causal relationship between the variables. After 
observing states with the largest increases in their spatial polygons and the number of terror 
attacks in the corresponding years, it is clear that terrorism has increased significantly between 
2011 and 2013 and at roughly the same rate as increases in mobile coverage. However, there are 
several outliers which had significant increases on coverage and negligible increases in terrorism 
or even decreases in terrorism. Afghanistan had a significant increase in 3G coverage from 2011 
to 2012 and then little to no increase from 2012 to 2013 as seen in Figure 1. Consequently, in 
2011, there was 372 terror incidents in Afghanistan and 1,041 and 1,151 incidents in 2012 and 
2013, respectively as seen in Figure 3. This seems to validate my hypothesis. However, Saudi 
Arabia’s 3G coverage saw an increase of over 1,000% between 2012 and 2013, but only 
experienced 1 more terror attack in 2013 than in 2012. This seems to disprove my hypothesis. 
That said, Saudi Arabia has a strong authoritarian government which Afghanistan does not have, 
and it scores a 6.7 for state legitimacy on the Fragile States Index. The absence of a state 
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legitimacy seems to be correlated to higher incidents of terror attacks. The same can be seen with 
the Gulf Coast Cooperation (G.C.C.) countries such as Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
which both have strong central governments. There are also states such as Bahrain which saw 
minimal increases in 3G or GSM coverage, as seen in Figure 2, but experienced more terror 
attacks. Some states such as Syria or Israel that experienced an uptick of terror attack or a sudden 
reduction with no significant coverage increases can be attributed to the progression of the 
Syrian civil war or the lead up to the Israel-Gaza conflict. This leads me to believe that there are 
regional and state characteristics that have an influence and a larger research project with data for 
more states and more countries is necessary. Overall, 2013 saw the greatest number of terror 
attacks in eight of the sixteen states analyzed as represented in Figure 4.  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Figure 1 
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Figure 2
Figure 3 
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Figure 4
Policy Recommendations 
To mitigate the benefits that terror groups get from accessing mobile coverage networks, 
governments can target coverage in specific areas in which terror groups operate such as the 
certain territories in Pakistan. Additionally, social media sites and search engines must better 
regulate their platforms to shut down potential terror cells that operating on it. States should also 
establish and maintain monitoring systems to obtain intelligence from correspondence on these 
networks.  
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CONCLUSION 
Cell phone coverage along with the lack of a strong central government allows for the 
proliferation of violent non-state actors. While there are correlations which point to this 
conclusion, to better understand and establish this link further, research must be conducted which 
controls for local and regional characteristics and analyzes data from years with the most rapid 
expansion of cell phone coverage in the early to mid 2000’s. Data limitations in this project 
restricted my ability to establish a link between cell phone coverage and terror incidents.  
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